Authority and Power in Social Interaction explores methods of analyzing authority and power in the minutiae of interaction. Drawing on the expertise of a diverse international team of organizational communication and language and social interaction scholars, this book suggests reverting the perspective that notions of authority and power constrain human activity, to determine how people (re)create them through conversation and other joint action.
xii Contributors deliberation, disagreement management, social identity, communication design and the coordination of actions in personal and public contexts.
Nan Wang is an associate professor at the School of Public Administration, Hunan University. Nan completed her PhD in sociology at University of California, Los Angeles. Her research focuses on talk and social institutions. She is actively collaborating in the context of several disciplines such as communication, medicine and artificial intelligence. This book takes as a starting point a polemical assertion: that current literature on authority and power does not, in fact, specifically observe authority or power. This is not to say that the literature is wrong. Existing perspectives are quite correct when they provide insight on the way income, gender or racial differences are perpetuated (e.g., Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004 ; Lee Ashcraft & Allen, 2003 ) or how our views of management are rooted in war ( Banerjee, 2008 ) . These studies have drawn attention to the fact that the current state of relations between groups of people is anything but "normal," as in fact a lot of political work is involved in making them appear natural to begin with and to maintain their matter-of-fact character ( Deetz, 1992 ) . In this sense, studies of power and authority-and related conceptshave drawn attention to the way cultural industries may obfuscate individual agency and reason ( Gramsci, 1971 ; Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002 ; Kracauer, 1930 Kracauer, , 1998 , to the way documents, records, and archives are forms of population control ( About & Denis, 2010 ; Derrida, 1996 ; Vismann, 2008 ) , or to how bodies are turned into citizens through inclusion in the political body ( Agamben, 1998 ) . Authors from a range of disciplines have shown that authority and power are diffuse and shift shape to espouse the contours of the many instruments and apparatuses through which people's behavior is directed and corrected . So far, scholarship has therefore offered us a political perspective to our social life. To them, authority and power are vantage points from which to study society, but the notions have been deemed both too polymorphous and too fleeting to be pinned down. It has always appeared that any one definition would blind us to other centers of power and leave us vulnerable to ceaselessly renewed arrangements of control and exploitation.
Those authors who did venture definitions of power and authority have often done so by contrasting them from each other or from other neighboring notions. The first to do so was arguably Weber (1922 Weber ( /1968 ), for whom "domination" is the "quite general" term that designates "the possibility of imposing one's own will upon the behavior of other persons," which can take the form of economic power whereby
Introduction
In Search for the Specific Unfolding of Authority and Power Nicolas Bencherki, François Cooren, and Frédérik Matte someone commands resources that correspond to the recipient's interests, while authority would consist in the "power to command and duty to obey" derived from tradition, charisma or the law. For Simon (1947 Simon ( /1997 , authority rests in the suspension of choice between alternatives, thus leaving the decision to the superior, whereas influence is the assessment of arguments provided and deliberate choice between options.
In contrast, Lukes (1974 Lukes ( /1998 ) views authority as the subordinate's agreement with the content of a decision or with the process through which it is reached (and it is a form of power only if it is not, in fact, consensual), thus covering both authority and influence in Simon's (1947 Simon's ( /1997 definition. Lukes (1974 Lukes ( /1998 ) also compares his perspective to Parsons' (1967 , p. 308) view of power as a "capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization," which arguably covers what others would view as authority. Galbraith (1983 ) , for his part, distinguishes between condign power (or coercion), compensatory power (based on rewards) and conditioned power (based on persuasion), which take their source either from an individual's personality, property of resources or organizational hierarchy. These many contrasting, if not opposing, definitions point to the fact that power, authority and their related notions are elusive and that there is a need to change perspectives on how we approach them.
We have given just this task to the authors who contribute to this book: we asked them to share with us their perspective on how to tangibly observe and analyze authority and power. To make sure that we were all talking about the same empirical phenomenon, we added a further constraint by asking all authors to analyze the same interaction between Kim Davis, the former county clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, and David Moore and David Ermold, a couple seeking a marriage license after the 2015 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States to strike down all bans of same-sex unions. Despite several attempts-which the couple recorded, and to which they often invited supporters and members of the press-Davis continuously refused to provide them with a marriage license, invoking her faith as a justification for her defiance of the Supreme Court ruling. It is only after Davis was incarcerated for contempt of court that, eventually, the couple was able to obtain a license.
The particular event which we asked contributors to this book to analyze took place in 2016. The excerpt, which is available on USA Today 's YouTube channel as well as on David Ermold's, was largely disseminated through the media and is exceptionally rich. In particular, it involves several participants besides Davis and the couple. Moore and Ermold have several supporters and members of the press on their side (including another couple who eventually joins them in requesting a marriage license). On the other side of the counter, two other clerks remain mostly silent, while Flavis McKinney, a retiree who offers Davis moral support, is more vocal in encouraging her. As the chapters will all point out, the interactional scene is therefore much more sophisticated than usual superior-subordinate models suggest, and authority is all the more fascinating to analyze. The issue at stake-gay marriage-being a hotly debated human rights problem also makes it even more challenging to remain at the level of the interaction and resist the temptation to recourse to moral or psychological explanations, for instance. Despite this added complexity, all of the chapter contributors show that it is, indeed, possible to point at the way authority and power are concretely achieved in interaction .
In the following section, we present the dominant view to authority and power, which we propose to refer to as a "possessive" understanding (following Tello-Rozas, Pozzebon & Mailhot, 2015 ) . After that, we introduce a distinction between power-over, power-to and power-with (which we borrow from Follett, 1940 ) that helps tease out the benefits of moving past a focus on authority and power as something people possess. We then show that some precursor work has already hinted at the value of an interactional perspective before suggesting that empirical studies are already being conducted that take the interactional dimensions of authority and power seriously. This introduction ends by presenting the different chapters of this book.
The Possessive Epistemology of Power
While attempts to define authority and power have been divergent, we can observe at least some broad tendencies in the literature. Many have described power and authority following a "possessive epistemology" ( Tello-Rozas et al., 2015 ) . Indeed, authors have been conceptualizing authority and power as something people may "have," or as the outcome of having something. Hobbes (1651 Hobbes ( /1987 , Chapter X) already defined power in possessive terms: "The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good." More recently, Barnes (1984 , p. 180) distinguished the relation between authority and power using a possessive vocabulary: "to possess authority is to possess less than to possess power." The relationship between power and possession, indeed, is solidly anchored in Western thinking ( Field, 1941 ; Nichols, 2017 ) , making the owning of resources a key leverage for the exercise of power. Inheriting, among others, from Locke (1689/1821 ; see also Keyes, 1981 on Marx), we continue to believe power derives from property (of labor, of capital, etc.), and ultimately from one's ownership of one's own self, granted by none other than God.
Among these resources, the most commonly discussed is one's hierarchical position. "Holding" a position means having "the authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties" ( Weber, 1922 ( Weber, /1968 . Giddens (1984 , p. 258) proposes that authoritative resources derive "from the capability of harnessing the activities of human beings." Haugaard (1997, p. 111) further explains that "the actors who possess authoritative resources are those who can influence the life chances of others and/or patterns of structural reproduction." Holding that position may be achieved through bureaucratic rules but also through economic and legal tools; indeed, as Aghion and Tirole (1997 , p. 2) explain, the "right to decide" is allocated through an "explicit or implicit contract," especially when it comes to shareholders' power. Power also derives from the possession of natural and technological resources. For instance, Mitchell (2013 ) describes how energy-production technology, in particular the switch from coal transportation by ship to oil transportation through pipelines, changes relationships of power by taking away resources from workers, including the ability to obstruct transportation activities.
Other resources whose possession grants authority and power are French and Raven's (1959 ) five "bases" of power-reward, coercion, legitimacy, reference and expertise. For French and Raven, these operate principally at a psychological level. For instance, reference provides a person with power over another person because the latter is attracted to or identifies with the former. Similarly, French and Raven conceive of expertise as the perception the recipient has of the emitter's knowledge. Social psychology has also suggested that the possession of specific skills or personality traits contributes to leadership and authority, such as different forms of intelligence in leaders ( Boyatzis, Good, & Massa, 2012 ) or neuroticism in followers ( Hetland, Sandal, & Johnsen, 2008 ) . Each time, there is a supposition that a person-either the emitter or recipient of authority and power-may either have those sources or personality traits, or acquire them, for instance through training.
Speaking of power and authority in possessive terms can be problematic for many reasons, not the least of which being that it displaces the problem from the proprietor to the things possessed: saying that someone is powerful because they possess a resource raises the question of how that resource "has" power in its turn. For instance, how legitimacy may be "had" and how it affords authority is itself a conundrum (e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990 ; Erkama & Vaara, 2010 ) . Expertise also constitutes a field of study in its own right (see Eyal, 2013 ) . As for personality traits, the way they translate into concrete (inter)action remains problematic (see van Vuuren & Cooren, 2010 ) .
From Having "Power-Over" to Doing "Power-With"
Instead of looking at power and authority from the perspective of the resources that would enable them, they can also be studied from the vantage point of their "uses," a perspective to which Simon (1947 Simon ( /1997 hinted. For him, authority (and power, arguably) "enforces responsibility" (by allowing the imposition of sanctions on disobeying subordinates), "secures expertise in the making of decisions" (by restricting decisions to those authorized to make them) and "permits coordination of activities" (by ensuring that all subordinates follow the same general plan). These three "uses" can usefully be reworded using Follett's (1940 , p. 78 ) distinction between power-over, power-to and power-with.
A lot of ink has been expended on the power-over perspective, which attempts to understand how an elite group of people can control others or a set of resources. This corresponds, for instance, to Dahl's (1957 , p. 202 ) widely accepted definition: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." Besides the emphasis on the possession of resources discussed above, power-over is also the view adopted by many discourse-based discussions of power. For instance, Lukes (1974 Lukes ( /1998 ) notes that besides the traditional focus on decision-making, studying power also requires looking at non-decisionmaking power, which concerns topics that are kept outside of the realm of debate, as well as at ideological power, which reveals itself in the discrepancy between real and expressed interests.
Some of Lukes' ideas can, coarsely, be seen to align with , although Lukes distinguishes himself from his predecessor. In particular, Foucault views power as consisting in discursive and embodied "regimes of truths." These make power a relationship not between the powerful and the powerless but between all individuals and a constitutive feature of subjects. Authority, for its part, would consist in power relations' preoccupation with establishing their own truth, as in the case of experts such as physicians. Gramsci (1971 ) offers a similar view of power as stemming from hegemonic discourse: whoever can change power relations and make them appear commonsensical gains power-but being able to resist those discursive formations is power too. More recently, and with a more attentive focus on specific strategies by which hegemonic discourse is made possible, Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips (2006 , p. 2) have suggested that power follows specific "circuits," such as the episodic circuit of interactions, which in turn constitutes a dispositional circuit of meanings that form rules to be mobilized in further episodes, and a facilitative circuit that corresponds to the technologies that are put in place and that constrain or enable further episodes. Deetz (1982 Deetz ( , 1992 , for his part, stresses the importance of communication both in enabling and in revealing the naturalization of power relations, especially through specific conversational moves serving to obscure alternatives.
Building on these ideas, but shifting the emphasis to the ability of agents to act despite established systems of relations, some authors have adopted a "power-to" perspective and suggested that power should be understood as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his [sic] own will despite resistance" ( Weber, 1922 ( Weber, /1968 . For Giddens (1984 , p. 14) , this ability to act even in the face of adversity is a fundamental component of agency: "an agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to 'make a difference,' that is, to exercise some sort of power." It is also at the heart of Crozier and Friedberg's (1980 ) understanding of power as the margin of freedom a person retains in negotiating or resisting against the system of relations where they act. Such a view undergirds new institutional perspectives, in particular the literature on "institutional work" that proposes that people can alter the structures that constrain them ( Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006 ; Zundel, Holt, & Cornelissen, 2013 ) .
Rather than opposing a top-down or bottom-up view of power and prioritizing either component of the "duality of structure" ( Giddens, 1984 , p. 15 ), some authors have privileged a more immanent perspective. Adopting a "power-with" approach, they have insisted on the fact that power never leaves the firm ground of relations between individuals. Hegemonic discourse, for instance, may exist, but it exists not above but between individuals. At once refuting a possessive epistemology of power and a "power-over" perspective, Arendt (1972 Arendt ( /2001 explains that:
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his [sic] being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.
A power-with perspective, and its contrast with a possessive epistemology, is also summarized in Latour's (1986 , p. 264 ) suggestion that power is always mediated by others: "when you simply have powerin potentia -nothing happens and you are powerless; when you exert powerin actu -others are performing the action and not you."
A Situational View of Authority
The best formulation of the power-with perspective comes from Follett (1940 ) , who promulgated the "law of the situation," meaning that one person does not give orders to another but rather that both agree to defer to what the situation dictates. This casts the work of the researcher, but also the manager's, in a new light:
Our job is not how to get people to obey orders, but how to devise methods by which we can best discover the order integral to a particular situation. When that is found, the employee can issue it to the employer, as well as employer to employee . ( Follett, 1940 , p. 35) For Follett (1940 , p. 83) , the law of the situation has normative and emancipatory force: "If both sides obey the law of the situation, no person has power over another." Rather, people alter their relationships within each situation as they respond to it, thus continuously shaping new situations that "demand" new comportment from them. Follett calls for superiors and subordinates to come to a common understanding of the situation where they find themselves and to act together according to the situation's contingencies, rather than to confront each other. However, the law of the situation can also be understood as an empirical state of facts: it is the case, indeed, that people respond to continuously emerging situations, even when that situation consists in their superior giving them direct orders. The role of the researcher is to document how participants to a situation jointly figure out what it demands, how to react to it and possibly how to shape it in their turn ( Bencherki & Bourgoin, in press ) . A power-with perspective thus invites looking at authority and power as a situational accomplishment. This contrasts with the tendency to deductively and a priori define authority and power or to conflate having a clear understanding of these phenomena and reducing them to a few characteristics. A situational view, on the contrary, embraces the multifaceted, ephemeral and pervasive nature of authority, and yet paves the way to a detailed description of its inner workings. Following that path, we could hope to make power and authority accessible, at once to be researched, to be exercised and to be resisted.
Some authors have laid groundwork for a situational view of power and authority. They stress the role of communication and situate authority and power in the realm of interaction, at least in broad strokes. For instance, for Chester Barnard (1938 Barnard ( /1968 :
Authority is the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to or a "member" of the organization as governing the action he contributes; that is as governing or determining what he does or is not to do so far as the organization is concerned.
While it may be read as an invitation to study what "character" in a communication makes it authoritative, thus putting the emphasis on the "message," Barnard's suggestion can also be read, in a more generous manner, as leaving room for the "recipient" of authority to choose or not to be guided by that message, thus offering elements of an interactional approach (for a comparison of studies of "message" and studies of interaction, see Pomerantz, Sanders, & Bencherki, 2018 ) .
Herbert Simon (1947 Simon ( /1997 ) also hints at the interactional nature of authority when he explains that "each of the coordinated individuals sets for himself a criterion of choice that makes his [sic] own behavior dependent upon the behavior of others" and that "he makes his own decision at each point as to what those adjustments should be." For Simon, authority is a "relationship" between two individuals where a superior "frames and transmits decisions with the expectation that they will be accepted by the subordinate," and where the subordinate "expects such decisions" and accepts to adjust his or her conduct to them (p. 179). While Simon can hardly be considered an analyst of interactions, he had the merit of recognizing that authority does not reside (only) in an individual's resources or skills but (also) in the relationship between people, in the expectations they hold towards each other and in the way they adjust their respective conduct according to those expectations.
However, a truly situational view of authority, living up to the program laid out by Follett and integrating the insights Barnard and Simon point out-that people orient to each other's (communicative) actionsis just beginning to be formulated. This is particularly true in the efforts of interaction scholars.
Studying Power and Authority in Interaction
Looking at authority and power from an interactional standpoint has often been deemed impossible. In particular, studies on language and social interaction have often been criticized for their alleged incapacity to deal with questions of power, coercion and domination ( Cooren, 2007 ) . By exclusively focusing on what people do in interactional scenes, these studies have indeed been accused of being ill-equipped to address and analyze what makes the interactions they study possible in the first place ( Reed, 2010 ) . They overlook, the argument goes, the key role that structures, ideologies and power relationships play in the constitution of interactions. However, it remains unclear how these structures, ideologies and power relationships concretely manifest themselves in interaction. For the past twenty years, a growing movement of scholars has decided to go beyond the sterile opposition between agency and structure by openly analyzing everything that happens to make a difference in a given interaction ( Bartesaghi, , 2014 Bencherki & Cooren, 2011 ; Taylor & Van Every, 2011 . Instead of exclusively focusing on what people do, these scholars have also considered other forms of agency or authorship that seem to make a difference through people's turns of talk.
Critical discourse analysis is probably the approach that most explicitly formulates the agenda of studying power through its manifestations in communication and interaction ( Fairclough & Wodak, 1997 ) . While it also recognizes that domination is jointly produced by the dominated, who may naturalize the uneven properties of the relationship, CDA is, however, often biased towards the study of how elites discursively reproduce their dominant position: "CDA should deal primarily with the discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice and inequality that result from it" ( van Dijk, 1993 , p. 252) . CDA, in that sense, adopts a realist social ontology ( Bartesaghi & Pantelides, 2018 ) and borrows from Marx and the Frankfurt School in an attempt to integrate the structural conditions that affect discourse and language, and the constitutive role of language in reproducing structures ( van Dijk, 1993 ) . For instance, CDA research will explore the implications of news reports using the passive voice in creating ambiguity over the source of agency ( Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000 ) .
CDA's attempt to combine the minutiae of language with the broader context of its use has therefore brought criticism from both sides. As Bartesaghi and Pantelides (201 8) point out, CDA has been accused both of adopting too narrow a perspective, thus blinding itself to the social and structural aspects of power, and, on the other side, of bringing ideological a priori into its analysis of discourse. In that sense, CDA is exemplar of the very dilemma confronting interaction scholars in the study of power and authority, as to whether these can be found within interaction or are to be observed outside of it.
Strictly interaction-based approaches to authority and power, which would bracket out from the analysis everything that takes place outside from the situation at hand, remain rare. Many studies have touched upon situations where relations could arguably be described as asymmetrical. This is the case of Sanders' (1995 ) study of the strategic enactment of superior and subordinate role-identities. Zemel and Koschmann's (2016 ) work on instruction during surgical training, or Davies' (1990 ) analysis of agency allocation in the classroom, similarly describe how, through interaction, some people are jointly constituted as authoritative and others less so. These studies, following one version or another of conversation analysis, build on the idea that authority or power do not lie in the hands of one person or another but in their interactions. This idea is strikingly obvious when looking for occurrences of the word "power" in Sacks' (1992 ) Lectures on Conversation . With few exceptions, Sacks attributes power not to people but to procedures, devices and methods that people employ as part of their interactions. The only moment when Sacks may appear to agree with the "power-over" perspective is when he attributes power to culture in his famous lecture "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up" ( Sacks, 1992 , p. 236) . Even then, though, Sacks proceeds to discuss membership categorization devices and situates culture not in some looming, disincarnate force, but rather in people's conversational practice.
Following the idea that power pertains to interactional practices rather than to people, some rare explicit discussions of authority exist in communication studies. This is the case, for instance, of Benoit-Barné and proposal that authority is the outcome of practices by which people invoke various figures with which they share their actions (see also . Similarly, have shown that organizational members discursively constitute their organization as a "third" to which they agree to defer. These studies explicitly or implicitly build on Follett's (1940 ) view that people take their orders from the situation rather than from each other. For instance, Sanders and Bonito (2010 ) have shown how invoking the interest of the court proceeding or that of the judicial system in general is a way for a juror to exert influence on their peers. This sharing of the action's authorship between the juror and the institution in which they are involved thus multiplies the number of "authorities" that dictate the suggested course of action and that therefore lend it their authority.
The relationship between authority and authorship is also at play in suggestion that psychotherapist's authority proceeds from their ability to substitute patients' accounts with a therapeutic version. In agreement with this idea, other studies have shown how, in conversation, various matters of concern can come to be recognized as "co-authoring" or demanding particular courses of action, thus becoming "matters of authority." In other words, the distinction between elements that are "authoritative" and those that are not cannot be established ahead of the interactional situation where they are made relevant Vásquez, Bencherki, Cooren, & Sergi, 2018 ) .
Six Issues Concerning the Interactional Study of Authority and Power
To lay out a program for the study of authority and power from an interactional standpoint, we asked several authors-some of them wellestablished in the discipline, others up-and-coming-to look at the interaction between Kim Davis, David Moore and David Ermold. We asked each group of authors to ask a different question to the interaction, meaning that they had to tease out a different facet of what is going on in that county clerk's office. The analysis of a same interaction means that chapters refer to the same events, people and things. This may appear as redundant. However, as the reader will note, each approach and each chapter's focus connect those elements differently, bringing to light different relations between them. Within each chapter, we asked the different authors not to iron out their analytical differences but rather to make them apparent and to explain the merits and limitations of each interactional approach in teasing out the phenomenon being considered. Contributors, then, were honest and upfront about their different assumptions, and each guides the reader through what his or her perspective may or may not achieve to observe authority and power as they unfold in the interaction.
Chapter 1 , titled "The Authority of the 'Broader Context': What's Not in the Interaction?" looks at authority by highlighting how any text is always both a product and a producer of its very context. Bartesaghi, Livio and Matte show from this "wide-angle" perspective that rapports of authority taking place locally also bring to the table broader issues situated within the larger history of intolerance and discrimination. More specifically, these authors mobilize three complementary lenses to analyse the first twenty-five lines of the interaction where a "smile" from Kim Davis brings into being a more complex storyline than what it looks like at first. Conversation analysis (CA), the notion of dislocation and critical discourse studies (CDS) are mobilized to illustrate how this apparently inoffensive smile produced by Davis makes contextually present saidto-be absentees (ideologies, past experiences, historical power structures, etc.) from other contexts. As shown in this chapter, this smile thus plays a constitutive role in the revelation of local games of authority.
While Bartesaghi, Livio and Matte demonstrate how the notion of context is first and foremost a question of definition and appropriation by actors in situations, chapter 2 addresses institutionalized and socially sanctioned forms of authority, that is, what can be considered varieties of (more or less) formal authority. Vasilyeva, Robles, Saludadez, Schwägerl and Castor show how this apparent fixed and reified authority (i.e., formal) appears, in fact, as an array of ongoing negotiations among actors throughout the interaction. These authors mobilize discourse analysis, conversation analysis and a ventriloquial approach to study authority and power as interactional accomplishment and matters of negotiation for participants in talk-in-interaction. For all of the approaches mobilized in this chapter, authority is therefore grounded in participants' actions, even if it is considered formal to begin with. Chapter 3 , titled "How institutional authority and routine exertions of power can be mobilized, negotiated and challenged," invites us to study the many ways routines, rules, policies and procedures-i.e., institutionalized practices-are constitutive vectors of social encounters. Aggerholm, Asmuß, Boivin, Buttny and Krippendorff present several complementary viewpoints by which the emergence, enactment and demise of authority and power routines are analyzed. By looking at the data from a ventriloquial, accountability, micro-level as well as a multimodal routine perspective, each author of this chapter mobilizes their preferred approach to analyse the interaction. Boivin analyzes the many ways organizational actors ventriloquize and are ventriloquized by routines and procedures; Buttny discusses the role of the notion of accountability in constituting authority; Krippendorff also builds on the notion of accountability to show the critical role it plays in disrupting routine exertions of power; finally, Aggerholm and Asmuß stress the merits of multimodal analysis to look at how routines are mobilized or deviated from in constituting authority.
In chapter 4 , titled "Bodies, Faces, Physical Spaces and the Materializations of Authority," we broaden the perspective about authority and power by decentering the analytical foci from human subjects. The authors of this chapter thus propose three complementary analytical positions that show how things-whether physical objects or seemingly abstract entities-fully participate in everyday interactions. Denault and Plusquellec take insights from experimental research by comparing facial expressions to verbal statements and actions from their owner, an analysis that reveals discrepancies between the authority people invoke and what actually drives them to say what they say or do what they do. Bencherki and Bourgoin offer a transductive analysis by showing how things may participate in interaction regardless of the interpretation people make of them, as the meaning of their action proceeds for the contribution they make to broader activities. Finally, Cooren and Huey-Rong mobilize a ventriloquial perspective to show how the three people involved in the heated discussion can be positioned or position themselves as the channels by which other elements end up speaking and making a difference in the way the situation evolves.
In chapter 5 , titled "God, Love and the Apparently Immaterial Sources of Authority," Fauré, Martine, Milburn and Peters envisage sources of authority that appear, at first sight, rather abstract and immaterial. These authors indeed focus their analysis on nothing other than love and God by showing how they can be brought into being through speech, tone and visible actions. To do so, they mobilize four complementary lenses to analyze how actors in the scene manage to evoke or invoke these sources of authority in their respective turns of talk. Martine uses a constitutive view of communication to show the very materialization of love and God in the interaction and the relative authority they acquire as a result. Peters presents an ethnography of communication perspective to stress the part cultural and historical understandings play a part in authority. Milburn, for her part, draws on cultural discourse analysis to show that cultural premises can be displayed or located in discursive practices and therefore that authority is manifested in the way people act and relate. Finally, Fauré looks at God and love as symmetrical authorities that can be more or less materialized, drawing attention to the notion of absence.
Last but not least, chapter 6 , titled "Decentering the Analysis: The Authority of Spectators, Journalists and Others," offers yet another way to push the boundaries about authority by drawing attention to a broader range of people and objects in the scene, including those who do not speak. All four approaches mobilized in this chapter agree that authority is a dynamic and fluid phenomenon that is negotiated in social interactions even by agents that remain invisible. Benoit-Barné sees authority as being a relational occurrence happening through presentification. For Marsen, authority is mainly discursive and is manifested in the positioning of agents as well as the description of their actions and words by a narrator. For Yang, power and authority relate to widely shared assumptions by participants even if their manifestation depends largely on the situational constructions of relationships and identities. Finally, Wang mobilizes a conversation analytic approach to show how authority is socially constructed through participants' exchange of social actions.
Conclusion: Future Direction for Research
Our hope with this book is twofold. On the one hand, we want to contribute to current conversations regarding authority and power, for instance in the fields of sociology or management, by showing that it is possible to specifically point to the interactional dynamics by which these phenomena materialize in each specific situation. This is important not only as an academic exercise to offer more analytical minutiae for the study of otherwise evanescent notions but also as a political project, as we strongly believe that providing concrete leverage for either exercising or resisting authority and power can only be done when we better understand their concrete, day-to-day unfolding. Indeed, as long as we speak of these notions in abstract terms, they will continue to appear unescapable, as if authority and power were already there, surrounding and trapping us. The fact may be, though, that we surround and trap each other in a joint accomplishment that we often more or less consciously deny afterwards.
On the other hand, we also want to make authority and power salient problems within the language and social interaction community. These notions have often appeared to be too loaded to researchers who have preferred to speak in terms of "directing," "instructing," "holding accountable" and so forth. The fact, though, is that these may correspond precisely to what other social scientists refer to as authority and power, although at a different level of detail. Interaction scholars are often reluctant to address "big issues" that may appear well beyond the scope of their studies of localized interactions. Yet, they also claim that there is nothing that is not local: this means that phenomena of authority and power can never be "beyond" their reach. It is therefore up to them, also, to provide their own contribution to questions that certainly concern the members they observe.
By stating that questions of authority and power are not their concerns, some interaction scholars may paradoxically reproduce two distinctions that they claim to reject, namely the micro vs. macro distinction (by thinking that these issues are beyond their scope) and the member vs. analyst distinction (by refusing to use members' terms). It is therefore about time to reappropriate those notions to show how they constitute interactional accomplishment and, in the process, make them less taboo for us as well as for those who must deal with them in their daily life. van Dijk, T. A. (1993) . Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse & Society , 4 (2), 249-283. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926593004002006 van Vuuren, M., . "My attitude made me do it": Considering the agency of attitudes. Human Studies , 33 (1), 85-101. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10746-010-9137-x Vásquez, C., Bencherki, N., Cooren, F., & Sergi, V. (2018) . From "matters of concern"
to "matters of authority": Reflecting on the performativity of strategy in writing a strategic plan. claims as analysts about the smile and how to be reflexive about them. This remains a problem for the other two analyses and, arguably, for (C) DA more broadly. Whether attempting to construct and perfect a method for transcription and analysis in which the researcher is ideally (and idealized as) nonexistent, as in CA, or more explicitly acknowledging the analyst as part of the context and even considering this an inspired demonstration of the reflexive critical impetus, as in some Frankfurt School informed approaches to CDA ( Reisigl & Wodak, 2009 ; Wodak & Meyer, 2009 ), both the theorizing and the systematic empirical operationalizing of the analyst's role as-and in-context remain underdeveloped. It is here, perhaps, that incorporating more ethnographic tools associated with linguistic anthropology and the ethnography of communication may prove useful, a point indeed made by Blommaert (2005 ) and others. While some discourse analytic methods certainly employ such tools, their use is often pragmatic and limited.
To be sure, this is hardly a straightforward endeavor. In many cases, discourse analysts must grapple with discourses that are "already there," and this is not merely a matter of utility but also of necessity, given our role as watchers of already-present texts, events, and institutions. Some approaches to discourse analysis, such as Tracy's Action-Implicative Discourse Analysis (AIDA, e.g., 2010) that involves extensive fieldwork on everyday practices, or Wodak's DHA (e.g., Reisigl & Wodak, 2009 ; Wodak, 2014 ) , ordinarily incorporate ethnographic methods, but this sets some limits on what can be studied, how it can be studied, and what time frames are required-limitations that do not always fit researchers' agendas and possibilities.
Or, this might be an argument for what we have not included and may never know how to fully include, even as our fingers are typing this text to materialize the contexts of our analysis: our bodies and the bodies of others. Much like the service counter that both unites and divides the speakers on the scene and all the voices and the figures that are called to speak, present and absent, doing discourse analysis points to the limitations of capturing the sensory. Try as we may to meet the universe halfway (c.f. by inviting dislocation, ideologies, and technological displays into our analytical frames, the universe pushes us back. Though we may suspect what is and is not in an interaction, and though we may know it in our bodies, our discourse analyses have not yet provided us with adequate contexts to authorize this knowing.
Notes
1. The volleys spanned a three-year period (e.g., Schegloff, 1997 ; Billig, 1999 ) , with a follow up by Kitzinger (2000) . Not to be missed is Tracy's Forum ( 1998 ) . 2 . We employ DA as an umbrella term to several approaches to language and social interaction (see Stubbe et al., 2003 ; Tracy, 1998 ) that consider text and context to be politically and socioculturally entangled.
3 . To avoid a strawman argument, we acknowledge that using images together with transcripts is not new. CA, for example, has been studying the gaze to understand how interaction is coordinated since its beginnings. 4 . As the clip entreats, "watch Kentucky clerk"-thus setting up different in-themoment displays, each including different watchers.
"God," federal law, etc. In applying conversation analytic, discourse analytic, and ventriloquial approaches, we note that they are compatible in illustrating how varieties of formal authority are negotiated through language-use in social interactions. Where they differ is in the aspects of conversation that they attend to, with DA analyzing identities and discursive strategies, CA focusing on conversational sequence and how participants orient to institutional rules, and the ventriloquial approach examining how authority is accomplished in a topical and content-oriented way, focusing on direct and indirect references to sources of authority. DA and ventriloquial approaches noted how institutional language was used to navigate complying and not complying with local expectations, as well as the different ways legitimacy was enacted. On the other hand, DA and CA have more in common with each other in terms of examining interaction-CA in particular focuses on turn-by-turn actions-while ventriloquial analysis can examine a single utterance.
For all of the methods applied herein, "authority" is grounded in participants' actions: what they say and do. Even the extent to which authority is "formal" is negotiated and performed, reproduced and resisted, in the participants' local organization of their activities. These perspectives on more or less formal varieties of authority may emphasize different mechanisms for how authorities are made relevant (e.g., in the display of identities and framing of talk versus the sequential organization of actions versus the distribution of voiced content across agents), but share a common social constructionist critique of authority as something that is obviously located in particular persons or roles.
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Hence, working on this chapter was an exercise in appreciating the multi-dimensional nature of social interaction. The introduction to this chapter enumerated what we came to believe we shared: a deep commitment to where and how social phenomena are embodied and practiced. First, Boivin's looking for how we are ventriloquized by the voices of others questions who we really are. Second, Buttny tells us how authority is communicated. Third, as a critical scholar, Krippendorff argues that the exertion of authority implies submission. Holding authorities accountable can disrupt routine exertions of power and create spaces of possibilities that are normatively denied. He also links human agency to such socially constructed spaces which are continuously established as real. Aggerholm and Asmuß's emphasis on routine practices of authority in organizations highlights what we mindlessly do by playing our roles in various organizations. All in all, the encounter we examined demonstrated how routines can be shaken and the claim to be a mere puppet of someone or something else can be questioned, encouraging us to become aware of what we can do. Finally, in view of our analyses of how authority and power are negotiated, Krippendorff reminds us that we cannot escape issues of scientific authority. Not only do we have to provide accounts of our scholarship to our academic communities, we are also accountable to those we theorize, who benefit or may be harmed by our analyses, and to be consistent with our concerns, we also have to refrain from employing explanatory frameworks that leave those described no choice but to comply.
It is this game of expression that the ventriloquial analysis helps us decipher and analyze.
Conclusion
The three analytical perspectives presented above share a commitment to decenter the analysis towards the "things"-whether physical objects or seemingly abstract entities-that are active in the situation. In Vincent Denault and Pierrich Plusquellec's proposal, insights from experimental research comfort the analyst's recognition of facial expressions, which are then compared to verbal statements and actions from their owner. In that sense, facial expressions may challenge the speakers' other expressive modalities and reveal discrepancies between the authority they invoke and what actually drives them to say what they say or do what they do. Nicolas Bencherki and Alaric Bourgoin, for their part, suggest that things may participate in interaction irrespective of the interpretation people make of them. The meaning of their action proceeds from the contribution they make to broader activities. Since a same action may participate to several activities, it also has several meanings. Negotiating authority, then, consists in pointing out different activities to which action contributes, and therefore its very meaning. Finally, François Cooren and Huey-Rong Chen propose an analytical strategy based on the observation of the way people share the authorship of what they say and do with different figures, which are thus brought into the situation and presented as authorizing those actions, thus sharing their authority with the speaker. Note 1. In this section, we capitalize the word Love to stress the parity between God and Love.
in the establishment of authority, thus contributing to a more thorough understanding of the phenomenon. All the approaches in this chapter agree that authority is a dynamic and fluid phenomenon that is constructed and negotiated in social interactions, even by agents that remain invisible, marginal or unspecified. Each perspective, however, differs in focus and emphasis. According to Benoit-Barné, authority is relational, emerging in social interaction through presentification, a communicative process by which agents cocreate and negotiate the emergence of authority. For Marsen, authority is discursive, manifesting in the positioning of agents and the description of their actions and words by an orchestrating presenter, or narrator. In Yang's analysis, power and authority relates to widely shared assumptions (for instance, the idea of "media power"), but their enactment largely depends on situational construction of relationships and identities. Finally, Wang follows a conversation analytic approach that explicates how authority is socially constructed through interactants' exchange of social actions and their orientations toward the social relations embodied in their actions. Table 6 .1 provides an overview of what characterizes the four approaches.
